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 Preemption, Prevention, and Predation: 
Why the Bush Strategy Is Dangerous
Henry Shue
In the 20th century, what passed for Western civilization sank very low in the 
depths of the two World Wars: WWI, “that savage war of attrition”1  in which 
combatants slaughtered each other between unmoving trenches, and WW II, 
in which civilians were massively targeted in fire-bombings like Dresden and 
Tokyo, culminating in the U.S. use of weapons of mass destruction against 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.2   The Charter of the United Nations, launched in 
the United States, opens with an eloquent appeal against the repetition of 
slaughters of either kind: “We the peoples of the United Nations, determined 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our 
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind ... have resolved to combine 
our efforts ...”  The Charter firmly establishes, in Article 2:4, that, as a matter 
of binding international law, military force may be used only in defense.  This 
principle of self-defense only constituted a fundamental narrowing of what had 
previously counted as acceptable grounds for going to war.  
In academic discussion questions about the resort to war subsequently nar-
rowed down strictly to consideration of what constituted aggression; Michael 
Walzer could write in his now-classic volume, “Aggression is the name we give 
to the crime of war.”3   What was right was self-defense; what was wrong was 
aggression.  And aggression was assumed to be the first-use of military force.
The first Administration of President George W. Bush announced what 
sounded like a radical challenge to this clear paradigm.  In its National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America in September 2002 the Bush Adminis-
tration announced its policy of what it called “preemption,” asserting: “The 
United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter 
a sufficient threat to our national security.  The greater the threat, the greater 
is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking antici-
patory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time 
and place of the enemy’s attack.  To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by 
our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively....  The 
United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.”4 
In advocating “anticipatory action to defend ourselves” the National Security 
Strategy attempts to break the link between first-use of force and aggression. 
The proposal is that force can be initiated in a manner that is defensive.  It is 
the meaning and prudence of this policy that I want to explore here: does the 
policy of “preemption” make the world that the United States confronts safer 
or more dangerous?  In the Summer 2004 issue of Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
David Luban largely defends the Bush Administration’s policy in an article 
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titled “Preventive War,” a title that reflects Luban’s judgment — correct, in my 
opinion — that although the National Security Strategy uses the terminology 
of “preemption,” what it actually defends is preventive war.5   ‘Preemption’ 
is a response to an attack that is imminent or in some sense already on the 
way.6   Preventive war is an attack intended to disarm an adversary before the 
adversary can launch an attack.  President Bush has made it quite clear that 
although he uses the wrong term, “preemption,” what his administration is 
advocating is preventive war.  I will return to this point later.
Although Luban is on the whole defending the Administration’s policy, he 
mentions a criticism of the policy based on work done by Thomas Schelling 
concerning the nuclear balance of terror during the so-called Cold War.  I believe 
that the problem seen by Schelling is more serious than Luban credits it with 
being, although there is a significant exception to it, and some qualifications 
are needed.  So I will first elaborate the objection to preventive war based on 
Schelling’s reasoning, and then note the limitation and some of the qualifi-
cations on the objection when the preventive war is aimed against terrorism.
Schelling’s objection applies to first-use of force as such, irrespective of 
whether the first-use can be argued to be defensive.  David Luban puts the 
criticism of the doctrine of preventive war derived from Schelling as follows: 
“The doctrine actually makes rival states into potential threats to each other 
by permitting preventive invasion of potential adversaries based on risk cal-
culations whose indeterminacy makes them inherently unpredictable by the 
adversary — and then it licenses attacks by both of them, because now they 
are potential threats to each other.  In Thomas Schelling’s imagery, it is always 
possible that I will have to shoot my rival in self-defense to stop him from 
shooting me in self-defense.”7   I will spell this out a bit more fully.
Suppose nations A and B are rivals, but live in a world in which a norm of 
no-first-use of force is well-established, that is, (1) it is well-understood that 
while a military response to an attack is permissible (and perhaps even oblig-
atory), an initial attack is impermissible; and (2) most of the time nations do 
not launch attacks on each other, in part because of the understanding that 
such initial attacks are impermissible.  The rarity of attacks is “because of the 
understanding” about the norm in two respects.
One reason why leaders do not initiate attacks is that they understand that 
it is wrong; this need not be a conclusive reason, but it is a reason of some 
strength.8   A second reason why they do not attack is that they realize that 
there is most likely nothing to gain by attacking and certainly much to lose: 
most likely nothing to gain from attacking because, in particular, there is little 
reason to fear that if they do not attack, they will be attacked, since others too 
generally abide by the prohibition on first-use of force; and much to lose because 
if they attack, they entangle themselves in the unpredictable destructiveness of 
war, so emphasized by Clausewitz, in which the advantages, if any, of attacking 
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first ordinarily are vastly outweighed by the advantages of staying out of war.
It is certainly not the case that a world with even a very well-established norm 
of no-first-use of force is a safe world, because there will still be violations of the 
norm: sometimes one nation attacks another nation, and the victim must then 
defend itself, after having suffered the disadvantage of undergoing the attack. 
The extent of disadvantage depends upon the kind of attack — at the extreme, 
if the attack were a massive attack with nuclear forces, the disadvantage would 
be enormous, quite possibly devastating.  The world of no-first-use is far from 
being a world of full security or a worry-free world.  One must always worry 
to some extent about norm-violators.  A nation that violates the norm and 
attacks in spite of it may inflict terrible damage on its victim.  But the world 
with the well-established norm of no-first-use has one huge advantage: namely, 
it is a world from which a major reason for starting wars has been removed. 
The reason that has been removed is the reasonable fear that the price of not 
attacking first is most likely to be suffering an attack oneself.  
It is not, as I have just said, that it is impossible that one will be attacked if 
one does not go ahead and attack — even the mostly deeply entrenched norms 
cannot not make violations impossible.  But it is much more likely than not 
that one will not be attacked, because generally nations do not attack each 
other if a norm against attacking is well-entrenched.  Nothing is certain: one’s 
own case may be the exceptional case in which the norm is violated and the 
attack comes.  But the odds are that it is safer to wait and see than to launch 
a war that most likely would never have occurred at all if one had not started 
it oneself.  The norm against first-use does not, and cannot, guarantee one’s 
security, but it raises the odds in favor of security high enough to make it 
generally safe to wait and see.  
The crucial factor is that a virtuous, not a vicious, circle is created by the 
content of the norm.  It is safer for everyone to wait, so it is safer for one’s rival 
to wait, which means that the rival will probably not attack, which means that 
it is safer for oneself to wait, which means that it is safe for one’s rival to wait. 
It is not reasonable for anyone to believe that they are better off attacking 
first on the grounds that they will otherwise be attacked.  A world in which 
everyone is waiting to see if anyone else is going to attack them is a world 
with no wars occurring.
I do not want to seem to exaggerate the advantages of the world with the 
entrenched norm of no-first-use of force; this is a matter of what actually tends 
to happen, not what we would like to have happen.  Two limits in particular 
must be emphasized.  First, this is a matter of probability, not certainty.  The 
entrenched norm makes the initiation of force much less likely than otherwise 
and makes the initiation of force less likely than not in many circumstanc-
es.  Nothing, however, is guaranteed.  Second, only one reason for attack is 
removed by the entrenchment of the prohibition on first-attack, namely the 
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fear that if one does not attack first, one will be attacked first.  Many other 
reasons for attacking other than the fear of being attacked are available, for 
example, having a strong first-strike capacity and a weak retaliatory capacity, 
or simply hating the people of the other nation so much that you would like to 
see them all dead.   Nevertheless, the fear that if one does not attack first, one 
will be attacked, is a powerful and common motive for the initiation of war. 
That fear cannot be completely removed, but the odds can distinctly favor not 
acting on the fear over acting on the fear, in a world of general no-first-use.
I hope this makes clearer the significance of Luban’s saying, in Schelling’s 
imagery, that in the world lacking the norm against first-use — the world of 
permissible preventive war — it is always possible that I will have to shoot 
my rival in self-defense to stop him from shooting me in self-defense.  In the 
world of no-first-use I can of course try to shoot my rival  — I may simply hate 
him and want to destroy him.  What I cannot ordinarily do is to claim that I 
attacked out of fear that he would shoot me, because in the world of no-first-
use he more than likely was not going to shoot me, even if he would like to.  
In the world of preventive war the calculations really are different.  Since 
there is no norm-grounded general practice of not attacking first, but on the 
contrary it is taken to be permissible to attack first, I have much more reason to 
fear that my rival will attack me, especially because he has much more reason 
to fear that I will attack him — and, of course, most especially if I have issued 
a National Security Strategy announcing that I will henceforth be attacking my 
enemies before they can attack me!  In this case, he has excellent published 
grounds for thinking that unless he attacks me first, I will attack him first, which 
means that he could indeed attack me in self-defense, which means that I could 
indeed attack him in self-defense.  Here we have a vicious circle of the worst 
sort precisely because we have renounced the prohibition against first-attack. 
Now he may have to kill me in self-defense lest I otherwise kill him in self-de-
fense.  In the circumstances attacking becomes the reasonable option.  The 
situation in the world of no-first-use has been reversed.  A virtuous circle has 
been replaced by a vicious circle.  A world in which it was more reasonable not 
to attack has been traded for a world in which it is more reasonable to attack. 
A relatively secure world has been degraded into a highly dangerous world.
Have we then shown the Bush war-doctrine to be misguided?  Not so fast. 
What we have seen is what Thomas Schelling already showed nearly half 
a century ago: other things equal, a world of mutual prevention is far more 
dangerous than a world of mutual restraint, where the restraint takes the form 
of a shared norm against first-use of force.9   The normative restraint makes a 
practical difference if what I am calling one’s rival is reasonable in the respect 
that he adjusts his strategy to the situation and, in particular, when he feels 
reasonably safe from attack, he is willing to refrain from attacking.  He is content 
to leave us safe provided he seems safe from us.  He may not like us, but he is 
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not primarily interested in destroying us but in being safe from being destroyed 
by us.  He is content with what used to be called ‘peaceful co-existence’ — he 
tolerates us if we tolerate him, at least to the extent of not attacking us.  In 
dealing with such rivals, doing anything to weaken the prohibition against 
preventive war is foolish.
What I am ignoring so far, however, is that some of our “rivals” are terrorists, 
whose primary intermediate goal appears to be our destruction and who prefer 
mutual destruction to the mutual security that entails a policy of peaceful 
co-existence.  Now, there is much about terrorism that I do not understand or 
know about, and I want to avoid the pretense, all too common nowadays, of 
being an expert on terrorism — suddenly everyone claims to have in-depth 
understanding of terrorists.  Without pretending that this is the only kind of 
terrorist there is, or that I know which kind of terrorist there are the most of, 
let me simply talk about what I take to be one kind of terrorist, which certainly 
has some claim to be the worst kind and which I will call predatory terrorists. 
I am simply stipulating that predatory terrorists are people who are determined 
to destroy us insofar as possible.  Perhaps they hate us, and they want to harm 
us.  In any case, their critical feature is their inflexibility, so their attempted 
killing is unconditional.  It is definitely not that they want to kill us if they 
think we are trying to kill them — their desire to kill us is not conditional on 
what we now do or do not do.  They want to kill us, period — unconditionally. 
This at least simplifies matters.
In dealing with predatory terrorists, the standard objection against legitimizing 
preventive war, and de-legitimizing the norm of no-first-use of force, which we 
have just been examining, is, unfortunately, irrelevant.  The now-standard, 
Schelling objection is that by weakening the prohibition on first-use we risk 
creating a vicious circle that increases the danger to ourselves.  But there can 
be a vicious circle only where one’s rival’s strategy is to some degree responsive 
to one’s own.  The predatory terrorist, however, does not respond to what I 
do or try to do.  He is simply trying to kill me, whatever I do.  I cannot make 
matters worse by choosing the wrong strategy, because his strategy will not 
respond to mine — it will not change conditional on what I do.  Whatever 
I do, he is still simply trying to kill me.  Again, I do not claim to know how 
many such terrorists there are, but there certainly are some.
Therefore, Schelling’s objection is not a reason not to issue a statement to 
all predatory terrorists informing them that we will do our best to kill them 
before they kill us.  They were doing their best to kill us before we issued the 
statement, and they will continue to do their best, unless they change their minds 
for other reasons entirely of their own, to kill us after we issue the statement. 
Have we then shown the Bush war-doctrine not to be misguided?  Once 
again, not so fast.  What I have claimed is that with regard to people who are 
in fact unwaveringly predatory terrorists, we may not make them more dan-
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gerous by waging preventive war against them.   If we can accurately identify 
and precisely target predatory terrorists who are actively preparing to kill us, 
we do not have the standard reason to think that by trying to attack them 
before they can attack us, we make the world more dangerous for ourselves.
Do we make the world less dangerous?  Consider two ways preventive attacks 
may go wrong.  One’s first thought probably is that at least there will then be 
fewer predatory terrorists gunning for us.  However many we kill makes that 
many fewer.  Unfortunately, this is a simplistic factual assumption about a 
complexly dynamic situation.  It is perfectly possible that every time one kills 
one predatory terrorist, two more volunteer to take her place.  I do not know 
that this is true, and I am not claiming to know.  But I am fairly confident 
that those ‘experts’ who claim to know otherwise are basically making it all 
up — many of those we see on TV do not know much more than I do about 
this psychological dynamic and are simply spinning out their theories without 
a great deal of real evidence.  We certainly know some cases in which this 
body-count mentality turned out to rest on fantasy.  The case I know best 
is the U.S. invasion of Vietnam in the ‘60s and ‘70s.  The Pentagon kept 
counting dead Vietcong, and the numbers of living, fighting Vietcong kept 
rising.  Young people were clearly joining faster than they were being killed. 
Are terrorists like guerrilla fighters in this respect?  I do not know, but I have 
not seen any evidence to show otherwise.  Nevertheless, since this is a tangled 
factual question about which I have no special knowledge, I will drop it simply 
with the caution that the number that matters for your own safety is not how 
many you have killed but how many come to take their places.  Absolutely 
nothing stops both numbers from rising simultaneously.  Body-counts often 
have nothing to do with military victory, especially when “the adversary” is a 
broad and fluid insurgency. 
So, I leave aside the question whether killing terrorists leads to fewer or 
more terrorists and turn to a second way in which preventive war might go 
wrong.  It is critical to understand how narrow the point I have initially made 
in defense of preventive war against predatory terrorists really is.  It applies 
exclusively to attacks upon people who are “unwaveringly predatory.”  Attacks 
that are indiscriminate between the predatory, on the one hand, and the pos-
sibly not predatory and the certainly not predatory, on the other hand, remain 
subject to the standard (Schelling) objection.  A sure-fire way to give people 
of many different kinds a compelling incentive to act like predatory terrorists, 
irrespective of whether they started out as predatory terrorists, is to treat them 
all like predatory terrorists.  The underlying logic is this: those who are fairly 
confident that they will not be attacked need not attack out of fear that they 
will otherwise suffer attack, but those who do fear attack do have a reason to 
attempt to attack first.  The absolutely vital question about preventive attack, 
then, from the point of view of one’s own safety, is: who is in fact likely to fear 
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being attacked?  
Compare two critically different cases.  On the one hand, if the policy says 
that only predatory terrorists will be attacked, and in practice only predatory 
terrorists are attacked, then it will be as clear as such matters can be that only 
predatory terrorists (and anyone likely to be mistaken for a predatory terrorist) 
need to fear attack.  Thus only predatory terrorists (and anyone who believes 
himself likely to be mistaken for a predatory terrorist) would have an addi-
tional incentive to attack first, an incentive that the predatory terrorists will 
be unaffected by since they will attack as soon as they think they successfully 
can in any case.  On the other hand, if the policy is so vague that it is not 
clear who will be attacked, or if the policy says that only predatory terrorists 
will be attacked, but in practice other people are attacked, then people other 
than predatory terrorists will fear attack by us and will thereby have a reason 
to attack us.  We will indeed have made the world a more dangerous place 
for ourselves.
How does the Bush policy look with regard to this second source of dan-
ger?  The officially specified targets extend well beyond predatory terrorists, 
in two respects.  First, the policy statement speaks simply of “terrorists” and 
so presumably includes all terrorists.  Conceivably, all true terrorists are what 
I am calling ‘predatory terrorists,’ in which case it could be that simply saying 
terrorists is all right.  But obviously this has to be read as: everyone the Bush 
administration calls a terrorist, at any given time.  So a reason to fear U.S. 
attack, and therefore a reason to attempt to attack the U.S. first, is provided 
to everyone belonging to any group that the Bush administration describes 
as ‘terrorist.’  I have not investigated this, but one question is whether the 
label ‘terrorist’ is being applied to people who are not already unconditionally 
committed to attacking Americans.
Second, and much more important, those informed by the National Security 
Strategy that they are likely to be attacked include some sub-set of the world’s 
states: “rogue states,” which of course means every government the Bush ad-
ministration calls a rogue state, at any given time.  So a reason to fear U.S. 
attack, and therefore a reason to attempt to attack the U.S. first, is provided 
to any government that the Bush administration describes as a rogue state — 
“is provided to” it only if it does not already have all the reason it thinks it 
needs to be planning to attack the U.S. if it can.  So one critical question is: 
how many governments that the Bush administration calls “rogue states” are 
already unconditionally and unwaveringly planning and preparing to attack the 
U.S.?  “None now” would be my answer.  The Taliban government was a rogue 
state in the relevant sense of not only planning to attack but having already 
assisted in attacking the U.S., and I believe the U.S. could have been justified 
in attacking the Taliban government in Afghanistan if it had been willing to 
have completed the task before diverting resources into the previously planned 
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adventure in Iraq and leaving the Taliban in a position to attempt to come back 
to power.  But I know of no evidence that the Saddam Hussein government in 
Iraq was, or that the current governments in Iran and in North Korea, or any 
other governments now in power, are firmly and unconditionally committed 
to conducting, or assisting in conducting, attacks on the U.S.
If there is a government that is already firmly committed to conducting, 
or assisting others, such as terrorists, in conducting, attacks on the U.S., such 
that this government already has all the reason it thinks it needs to attack 
whenever and however it can, then informing that government that the U.S. 
intends to attack it first adds nothing significant to its reasons for attacking 
and therefore does not create the vicious circle that Thomas Schelling noted. 
To such a government David Luban’s criticism of the doctrine of preventive 
war that “the doctrine actually makes rival states into potential threats to 
each other” [emphasis in original] is irrelevant.  Such a government cannot 
be made into a threat because it is already a threat.  It is nevertheless quite 
conceivable that the fear of imminent attack would make it panicky and cause 
it to do something genuinely crazy that it would otherwise not have done, 
so it is far from guaranteed that matters cannot be made worse in important 
respects by the threat of preventive attack.  No state that was not already an 
enemy is made into an enemy, but a complacent enemy might be turned into 
a desperate enemy, believing it has nothing to lose by doing whatever is the 
worst it is capable of, prior to being attacked, such as using whatever weapons 
of mass destruction it has on whomever they will reach.
So, the first problem is that even an implacable enemy that is not behaving 
in a completely crazy manner may be turned into a crazy implacable enemy. 
How serious this problem is obviously depends partly on the capabilities of the 
government in question, including whether it has operational WMD and some 
means of delivering them.  But I want to emphasize two other potential failings 
that can create completely new likely attackers: vagueness and changeability. 
The safety of those who invoke a doctrine of preventive war depends on their 
making the specification of the identity of the targets of likely attack precise 
and firm, not vague and changeable.
It is a well-known feature of deterrence that ambiguity can be helpful, 
although this becomes a complicated matter.  Up to a point, however, if an 
adversary is not clear what you might do when to whom, the adversary may 
be very careful lest he inadvertently crosses some vague line in the sand that 
you have drawn but he cannot see.  If you think I am likely to fly into a rage 
at some point, but you are not sure where that point is, you may decide just to 
be very nice to me.  The threat of preventive attack, by contrast, works in the 
opposite way from deterrent threat.  I create no new enemies by threatening 
to attack those who are already going to attack me as soon as they can, but 
it must be unmistakable that I threaten them alone.  For if others, who are 
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not committed to attacking me, come to fear that they will nevertheless be 
attacked by me, they have an entirely new reason — not necessarily conclusive, 
of course — to attack me.  I have provided others with a reason for attacking 
me — this is dumb.  Enough enemies will appear on their own steam — I do 
not need to manufacture extra ones myself.
Accordingly, in order not to threaten governments that are not already 
predatory — to use the same label I used earlier for terrorists — it must be and 
remain absolutely clear who might be attacked. Frequent or arbitrary changes 
in a list of governments, or vague specifications of categories of governments 
who are on the list, make the world more dangerous for the people living under 
the government doing the threatening.
Preemption, or anticipatory self-defense, is an attack against a force from 
whom an attack on you is imminent.  Preemption attempts to stop or disrupt 
an imminent attack.  Determining what counts as an imminent attack is a dif-
ficult but at least familiar problem concerning which a fair amount of literature 
exists.  But if there was ever any doubt that when the Bush White House says 
“preemption,” it does not mean preemption, but means instead preventive 
war, the doubt was settled during the President’s appearance on NBC’s “Meet 
the Press,” broadcast Sunday, February 10, 2004, when he said: “I believe it 
is essential — I believe it is essential — that when we see a threat, we deal 
with those threats before they become imminent.  It’s too late if they become 
imminent.”10   At first there seems to be some kind of logic here — perhaps of 
the form: if early is good, earlier is better.  If eliminating a threat when it is 
imminent is good, eliminating it before it is imminent is even better.  But when 
one is talking about starting wars, it may not be the case that earlier is better.
The primary two reasons why starting a war sooner may not be better, for 
others or for yourself, than starting it later are the following.  First, it might 
be that if you had not started it sooner rather than later, it would never have 
started at all, because it was in fact not going to start later.  I believe that 
there are rare cases in which preemption is justified — where in the face of 
imminent attack, one is justified in attacking first.  This is a longer story than 
I can tell here.  But even those of us who believe that preemption is sometimes 
permissible must acknowledge the profoundly worrying possibility that what 
was intended to be a preemption — what was intended to be an earlier start 
to a war that was going to start in any case — was in fact the start of a war 
that would not otherwise have started at all and was therefore a tragic case of 
a war that need not have occurred and that occurred only because you yourself 
mistakenly began it.  Quite simply, it is always possible that a war that looks 
imminent is not in fact imminent — that although it appears certain to start 
later, it would never in fact have begun except that you began it with your 
so-called preemption.
I still believe that the bare fact that one could be mistaken is not a good 
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enough reason to wait if the case for an imminent attack by your adversary is 
sufficiently compelling and if — and this is an absolutely necessary condition 
— the costs of waiting will be extremely high.  If your defense will probably 
succeed whether you preempt or not, then surely you should wait for the actual 
attack, lest you be mistaken in thinking that the attack is coming.  But if the 
first strike is likely to be devastating and to leave you unable to resist, then, I 
think, preemption may be justified.  Still, you may never be sure that you did 
not start a war that could have been avoided and that all those who die and 
are maimed in the fighting suffer only because you got it wrong.
Clearly, if one ought to hesitate to attempt to preempt what is from every 
indication an imminent attack, lest one cause an avoidable war, one ought for 
the same reason to hesitate to attempt to, in the President’s words, “deal with 
those threats before they become imminent.”  If one might make a mistake 
about the apparently imminent, one is at least as likely to make a mistake, as 
President Bush himself did by attacking Iraq in March 2003, about the earli-
er-than-imminent.
Plainly, that one is “at least as likely to make a mistake” understates the 
danger of error and confusion so greatly as to be positively misleading.  The 
second reason to worry about preventive war is that however unlikely a pre-
emption is to be grounded in a mistake, a preventive war is far, far more likely 
to be grounded in a mistake.  It is hard enough to know that an attack is im-
minent — movements of troops and aircraft may be a feint, a bluff, an attempt 
at intimidation with no intention of follow-through if the intimidation fails. 
For instance, Henry Kissinger in October 1973 increased the alert level of U.S. 
nuclear forces, which has the effect of making it easier to launch missiles, simply 
to signal the Soviet Union to stay out of a conflict.11   This was a recklessly 
irresponsible act because the Soviet Union might well have thought a nuclear 
attack was imminent and have tried to preempt it with a nuclear first-strike 
of their own, or, somewhat more cautiously, might have raised the alert level 
of Soviet nuclear forces to signal Kissinger, who might then have thought a 
Soviet attack was imminent even though it was not.  Given how difficult it is 
to tell genuine preparations for a real attack from signaling and bluffing, one 
would like to know the operational criteria of a not-yet-quite-imminent threat. 
The policy of preventive war makes an heroic assumption: reliable intelli-
gence.  One can precisely and firmly designate the predatory governments in 
time for preventive attack only if one can obtain reliable intelligence in time. 
The intelligence failures concerning Iraq are nothing new — the U.S. intelli-
gence establishment has been performing badly for a long time.  For example, 
in spite of fabulous sums spent spying on Communist governments, especially 
the Soviet Union, during the decades of the Cold War, U.S. intelligence 
did not even come close to foreseeing the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In 
order to specify precisely, one must know precisely.  How likely is this?  One 
11
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comforting assumption is that while under-inclusiveness is a serious problem, 
over-inclusiveness is not.  If a predatory government were overlooked, that 
would be dangerous, so the solution is to err on the side of listing too many 
rather than on the side of listing too few.  But this comforting assumption that 
simply being pessimistic is the panacea, is false.  Over-inclusiveness — threat-
ening preventive attack against governments that are not predatory — is the 
formula for creating incentives for attacks on yourself that would otherwise 
not have occurred because the attacker would otherwise have felt reasonably 
safe against attack by you.  Threatening a few extra governments could be far 
from harmless.
The one thing worse than threatening attack against governments that are 
not predatory is actually attacking them.  This is one of the principal reasons 
why I believe that the U.S. and British attack on Iraq launched in March 
2003 is such a disaster for American and British interests (not to mention 
Iraqi interests).  Iraq was invaded on the grounds that it was close to attacking 
some other country with weapons of mass destruction or to providing weapons 
of mass destruction to terrorists who would attack.  This was not true.  Iraq 
was nowhere near being able either to use weapons of mass destruction itself 
or to provide them to terrorists (even leaving aside the question whether a 
secular dictator like Saddam Hussein would want to help a religious fanatic 
like Osama Bin Laden).
The Bush administration’s attempts to avoid facing the truth that they 
made a huge mistake by starting a war that did not need to be fought might 
be forgivable if they were not so dangerous to those of us who live in the U.S. 
or the U.K. in the way that they broaden and confuse the category of which 
states might be the target of a U.S./British preventive attack.  Perhaps the final 
reduction to absurdity came when John Bolton, then-Undersecretary of State 
and subsequently Ambassador to the United Nations, told the Associated Press 
that part of the justification for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was that the govern-
ment had working for it scientists capable of building nuclear weapons: “In an 
interview with The Associated Press, John Bolton, undersecretary of state for 
arms control, said that whether Saddam’s regime actually possessed weapons 
of mass destruction ‘isn’t really the issue.’  ‘The issue I think has been the ca-
pability that Iraq sought to have ... WMD programs,’ Bolton  said at the U.S. 
Embassy in Paris.  Bolton said that Saddam kept ‘a coterie’ of scientists ....”12 
I would imagine that at least half the governments in the world have ‘a 
coterie’ of scientists capable of building nuclear weapons working for them. 
Should they expect to have their governments overthrown by U.S. and British 
troops?  Of course not — Secretary Bolton was obviously just grasping at straws 
in an effort to cover up a major mistake — but it is dangerous to spread such 
confusion about which regimes might be susceptible to attack at the discretion 
of the U.S. government.  Making numerous regimes fearful that they may be 
12
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invaded by the U.S. and the U.K. is not a way to make U.S. and U.K. citizens 
safer.  First, indiscriminately broadcasting the fear of attack can make the world 
a more dangerous place by giving more actors the conviction that they might 
as well attack before they are attacked, as we have already seen.  Second, if one 
believes one’s own rhetoric, one may actually decide to attack governments that 
there is insufficient reason to attack, starting additional unnecessary wars.  Not 
only does this get people killed pointlessly on both sides, but it is a diversion 
from urgent matters like dealing effectively with predatory terrorists, a diversion 
that may allow yet other people to be killed unnecessarily.  
We have just noticed in succession two different problems that have essentially 
the same effects: faulty intelligence, like the false speculations about Saddam 
Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, and sloppy talk, like Ambassador John 
Bolton’s asserting that having nuclear scientists capable of building nuclear 
weapons is a good reason for being attacked.  Both sloppy talk and faulty in-
telligence lead to unjustified attacks and to dangerous confusion about who is 
liable to be attacked and why.  A doctrine of preventive war, of all doctrines, 
must be precise.  If we are not to take scientists capable of building nuclear 
weapons being on the government’s payroll as compelling evidence of a not-
yet-quite-imminent threat of using nuclear weapons, what are we to take as 
evidence?  The current U.S. Administration is yet to demonstrate that it is 
capable of spelling out any clear and defensible criteria.  And until they do 
they are making the world progressively more dangerous, for non-Americans 
and for Americans.
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